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WARDLOW REVISITED: HOW MEDIA COVERAGE OF POLICE 
BRUTALITY MAKES EMPIRICAL DATA MORE RELEVANT THAN EVER 
Jack T. Vanderford 
INTRODUCTION 
Freddie Gray stood on a street corner in West Baltimore when he made 
eye contact with a uniformed police officer.1  Gray ran from the area after 
seeing the officer, who chased Gray down and forced him to stop by drawing 
and threatening to use his Taser gun.2  A video taken by a bystander captures 
Gray screaming in pain as his arms are handcuffed behind his back and he 
is dragged into a police wagon by three police officers.3  
Subsequent to Gray’s arrest, and while he was in police custody, Gray’s 
spine was partially severed.4  Gray was taken to a nearby hospital where he 
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  The killings of black Americans, George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, and Breonna Taylor, occurred 
during this Comment’s final stages of publication.  These tragedies and their extensive media 
coverage suggests that revisiting empirical data and reversing Wardlow is more imperative than ever. 
 1 See Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray, DEP’T JUST., Office of 
Public Affairs (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-decline-
prosecution-death-freddie-gray (providing a detailed account of the circumstances leading up to 
Freddie Gray’s death and announcing that the Department of Justice found insufficient evidence 
to prosecute the police officers involved in Freddie Gray’s arrest).  
 2 Id. All that was discovered upon a frisk of Gray was a small switchblade, the legality of which was 
highly contested after the incident.  See Freddie Gray’s death in police custody - what we know, BBC (May 
23, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32400497 (noting one state prosecutor’s 
opinion that Gray was falsely accused of carrying an illegal knife).  
 3 See, e.g., Video Shows Arrest of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015, 6:05 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/local/video-shows-arrest-of-freddie-gray/2015/04/20/
c4afcd2c-e7c3-11e4-8581-633c536add4b_video.html?utm_term=.56eb9b06a683 (showing the 
forty-six second cell phone video capturing Gray’s arrest).  
 4 It is unclear exactly how Gray suffered his injury; however, reports from the incident suggest he 
suffered the injury after entering the police wagon. See Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody - what we 
know, supra note 2 (explaining that when “Mr. Gray was placed inside that van, he was able to talk 
. . . . [But when] Gray was taken out of that van he could not talk and he could not breathe[,]” and 
that some medical experts believe a “significant force” similar to a car crash would be required to 
inflict the sort of injury that Gray suffered); see also Joshua Barajas, Freddie Gray’s 
death ruled a homicide, PBS (May 1, 2015, 11:13 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/fredd
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underwent spinal surgery, lapsed into a coma, and died a week later.5  The 
six officers involved in Freddie Gray’s arrest and death were charged with 
manslaughter and murder by Baltimore State’s Attorney; however, all 
charges were ultimately dropped.6  Civil unrest spread throughout Baltimore 
in the wake of Freddie Gray’s death.7  Protests turned to riots as multiple 
businesses were looted and at least fifteen police officers were wounded.8  
Freddie Gray’s arrest and subsequent death highlights the potential for 
physical abuse of those in police custody.  The Freddie Gray tragedy also 
forces us to ask harder questions about how our society should balance 
effective policing policy with individual autonomy: Why did Freddie Gray 
run from the police in the first place?  Were the police justified in pursuing 
him?  What gave the police the legal authority to stop Gray?  
The answer to the latter question comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Illinois v. Wardlow.9  The facts of Wardlow are remarkably similar to those 
that led to the arrest and death of Freddie Gray.  On September 9, 1995, a 
four-car caravan carrying uniformed police officers converged on a 
neighborhood of Chicago known for drug trafficking.10  As the caravan 
passed through the neighborhood, one of two officers in the last car of the 
caravan spotted Sam Wardlow standing next to a building carrying an 
opaque bag.11  The officer observed Wardlow look in the direction of the 
caravan and flee in the opposite direction.12  After a brief maneuver to cut 
 
ie-grays-death-ruled-homicide (quoting Maryland’s state attorney Marilyn Mosby’s belief that 
Gray’s fatal injury “occurred while Mr. Gray was unrestrained by a seatbelt in the custody of the 
Baltimore Police Department wagon.”). 
 5 Christina Sterbenz, A ‘big question’ surrounds the arrest of Freddie Gray, which sparked riots across Baltimore, 
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:37 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/did-police-have-a-
right-to-stop-freddie-gray-2015-4.  
 6 See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No Federal Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-
federal-charges.html (reporting the Justice Department’s decision to not press charge against the 
police officers involved in Gray’s death because it lacked evidence proving the officers “willfully 
violated Gray’s civil rights”.).  
 7 See, e.g., Andrea K. McDaniels, Civil unrest related to Freddie Gray death caused depressive symptoms among 
mothers in affected neighborhoods, study finds, BALT. SUN (July 20, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-stress-freddie-gray-20170720-story.html (detailing a 
University of Maryland School of Medicine survey that found a twenty percent increase in those 
experiencing symptoms of depression among African American mothers in the Baltimore area just 
after Gray’s death, many of whom attributed their anxiety to “what was happening to their 
neighborhoods”).  
 8 Holly Yan & Dana Ford, Baltimore riots: Looting, fires engulf city after Freddie Gray’s funeral, CNN (Apr. 
28, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html.  
 9 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
 10 See id. at 121 (detailing the factual background).  
 11 See id. at 121–22 (detailing the factual background).  
 12 See id. at 122 (detailing the factual background).  
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him off, the officers frisked Wardlow and discovered a .38–caliber 
handgun.13  
Following his arrest, Wardlow moved to suppress the handgun found on 
him from evidence, arguing that the police did not have reasonable 
suspicion14 to stop him in the first place.15  After noting that a reasonable 
suspicion determination must be based on “commonsense judgements and 
inferences about human behavior[,]” the Supreme Court held that the gun 
was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.16  
The Court explained that Wardlow’s unprovoked flight alone did not create 
enough reasonable suspicion to justify a stop.17  Rather, the Court held that 
Wardlow’s unprovoked flight, in conjunction with his presence in a high-
crime area, justified the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in 
criminal activity.18  This precedent provided the police officers who stopped 
Freddie Gray the legal authority to do so, as Gray was in what was deemed 
to be a high-crime area of Baltimore19 when he fled.20 
Giving police officers additional authority to conduct stops of individuals 
that are located in high-crime areas raises the concern that such a policy will 
deny citizens equal protection of the law, under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
by allowing officers to use “high-crime area” as a proxy for stopping 
individuals based on race or socioeconomic status.21  While undoubtedly 
 
 13 See id. (detailing the factual background). 
 14 “Reasonable suspicion” is the legal standard required for a police officer to stop and frisk someone 
on less than probable cause.  The standard is met when an officer “observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and 
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . .” Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 15 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122. 
 16 Id. at 125.  
 17 Id. at 124.  
 18 Id.  
 19 What constitutes a “high-crime area” is the subject of some debate and is often criticized as being 
an overly broad and prejudicial term.  This Comment does not attempt to define what constitutes 
a “high-crime area.”  Instead, this Comment will critique the merits of Wardlow’s analysis as well as 
the ambiguity of the term “high-crime area.”  In the context of Freddie Gray’s case, the Justice 
Department stated after the incident that the police officers were in an area known for drug sales 
when they began chasing Gray.  See Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie 
Gray, supra note 1 (“At the time [Freddie Gray fled], the bicycle officers were conducting proactive 
enforcement in an area known for drug sales.”). 
 20 See Todd Oppenheim, Opinion, The bad court ruling that let police chase Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bad-court-ruling-that-let-police-chase-
freddie-gray/2015/12/21/28bc1e54-a78d-11e5-9b92-
dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html?utm_term=.d4f9bdc7b903 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wardlow is what gave police the legal authority to chase Freddie Gray).  
21  See Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 345, 
396 (2019) (detailing an empirical investigation based on administrative data from the NYPD, 
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important, this Comment will not focus on the effect of Wardlow’s ruling, but 
rather will challenge the merit of its arguments and underlying assumptions.  
Specifically, this Comment will challenge Wardlow’s assumption that an 
individual who runs from the police in a high-crime area is more likely to be 
engaged in criminal behavior than an individual who runs from the police in 
an area with less criminal activity.  
First, this Comment will provide a brief overview of the Terry Doctrine 
and explain how the Supreme Court in Wardlow filled the gaps left from 
previous Supreme Court decisions with “commonsense judgements.”  
Second, this Comment will review and address the arguments in favor of 
Wardlow’s precedent.  Third, this Comment will explain how empirical 
evidence, available to the Supreme Court when Wardlow was decided, 
counters the Court’s assumption that an individual’s flight from the police in 
a high-crime area is a reliable indicator of criminal activity.  Fourth, this 
Comment will argue for the continued applicability of old empirical 
evidence, especially within the context of increased media coverage of police 
brutality against blacks and waning confidence in the police among those 
most likely to live in high-crime areas.  Fifth, this Comment will explain the 
structural problem with Wardlow’s opinion and introduce possible 
alternatives to Wardlow’s precedent.  
I.  THE TERRY DOCTRINE AND WARDLOW’S USE OF  
“COMMONSENSE JUDGEMENTS”  
A brief overview of the constitutional framework behind stop and frisk is 
helpful to understand Wardlow’s underlying assumptions.  The Fourth 
Amendment establishes that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”22  Until the 1960’s, the Supreme Court had not authorized the 
search or seizure of a person on anything less than probable cause.23  
However, in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court focused 
on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and 
 
which found that “[t]he racial composition of the area and the identity of the officer are stronger 
predictors of whether an officer deems an area high crime than the crime rate.  And officers may 
even be using high-crime area as cover to bolster the appearance of constitutional validity in their 
weakest stops.”). 
 22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 23 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s general 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not preclude an officer from stopping 
an individual and frisking them for weapons if the officer can “point to specific and articulable facts 
which . . . reasonably warrant that intrusion”). 
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seizures” to make a new carve out for “on-the-street encounter[s]” between 
police officers and “suspicious persons[,]” commonly known as stop and 
frisks.24  
The Terry court did not explicitly address what constitutes permissible 
grounds for a stop.  Instead, the Court implicitly established that police 
officers have the authority to stop individuals if they have reasonable 
suspicion that an individual is engaging in serious criminal activity.25  The 
Supreme Court later expanded the Terry doctrine to allow officers to stop 
individuals if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a given individual is 
engaged in virtually any illegal activity, even minor traffic violations.26  
Unfortunately, the Terry court failed to specifically define what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion, noting only that the standard falls somewhere below 
probable cause27 and above an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch.”28  Later Supreme Court decisions provided additional guidance on 
what constitutes reasonable suspicion, which would instruct the Wardlow 
Court in its decision decades later.  
First, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Sokolow that a 
reasonable suspicion “is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of 
legal rules . . . . [Rather, a reviewing court] must consider the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.”29  In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the 
Supreme Court held that nervous or evasive behavior is a factor that can 
point to reasonable suspicion.30  However, in Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme 
 
 24 Id. at 9–10.  
 25 See id. at 30 (holding that “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[,]” he can stop 
the individual and search him or her for weapons); see also id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that an officer’s “justifiable suspicion” that an individual is about to engage in robbery 
“afforded a proper constitutional basis” for stopping that individual).  The Terry Court was explicit 
in laying out the standard for when an officer can frisk an individual, stating that a police officer 
can conduct “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has 
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . .” Id. at 27 (majority 
opinion).  
 26 See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (“[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry 
condition–a lawful investigatory stop–is met whenever it is lawful for the police to detain an 
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation.  The police need not have, 
in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity.”).  
 27 Probable cause is defined as existing where “‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves 
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being 
committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citation omitted).  
 28 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
 29 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 30 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (“[E]rratic driving or obvious 
attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 
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Court acknowledged that “a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not 
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or 
seizure.”31 
Previous Supreme Court cases discussing whether an individual’s 
presence in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion provided the 
Wardlow Court with ambiguous precedent for its decision.  In Adams v. 
Williams, the Supreme Court noted an individual’s presence in a high-crime 
area to be a relevant contextual consideration in deciding whether an officer 
had reasonable suspicion to stop that person.32  Yet, the Supreme Court later 
added in Brown v. Texas that an individual’s presence in a high-crime area 
alone was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.33  
These decisions provided the Supreme Court in Wardlow guidance for its 
analysis of whether Wardlow’s flight in a high-crime area supported 
reasonable suspicion.  However, the Wardlow Court ultimately based its 
decision on “commonsense judgements.”  The use of “commonsense 
judgements” in the reasonable suspicion analysis can trace its roots all the 
way to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry.  While acknowledging that the 
Fourth Amendment demands that an officer “be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts” that form the basis for his or her suspicion, the Court went 
on to explain that these facts may be “taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts” to arrive at a reasonable suspicion.34  
Importantly, the Terry Court qualified its endorsement of officers’ use of 
inferences from facts to arrive at a reasonable suspicion.  The Terry Court 
warned that “the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is 
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the 
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who 
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in the light 
of the particular circumstances.”35  In making its determination, the Court 
explained “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard . . . .”36 
 
6 (1984) (holding that two persons who spoke furtively to one another and urged others to leave the 
scene amounted to reasonable suspicion).  
 31 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).  
 32 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972).  But see id. at 158–59 n.5 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“The fact that [an individual suspected of carrying a gun is] in a high-crime area is 
irrelevant [to Terry’s reasonable suspicion analysis].  In such areas it is more probable than not that 
citizens would be more likely to carry weapons authorized by the State to protect themselves.”).  
 33 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that [a person] was in a neighborhood 
frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the person] himself was 
engaged in criminal conduct.”).  
 34 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id.  
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Later Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed the use of common sense in 
reasonable suspicion determinations.37  This ultimately led the Supreme 
Court in Wardlow to adopt the use of “commonsense judgements and 
inferences about human behavior” and inject its own view of the world into 
its determination of the case.38  An individual’s flight at the sight of the police, 
according to the Court, goes beyond an individual’s right to ignore the police 
and go about one’s business.39  Instead, the Court argued that Wardlow’s 
headlong flight at the sight of a police officer was “the consummate act of 
evasion.”40 
As previously mentioned, the Court did not go as far as to create a bright-
line rule that flight in the presence of a police officer automatically gives rise 
to probable cause that that individual is involved in criminal activity.41  
Instead, the Court relied on the context of Wardlow’s flight, specifically his 
presence in an area known for narcotics trafficking, to justify a finding of 
reasonable suspicion.42  In doing so, the Court relied on its “commonsense” 
judgement that a man who runs at the sight of the police in a high-crime 
neighborhood is likely to be engaged in criminal activity.43 
At first glance, the Wardlow Court’s decision may not seem problematic.  
Minimizing the level of crime in society is a goal most people support and 
increasing police power could help achieve that goal.44  An individual’s flight 
at the sight of a police officer may naturally indicate to many that the 
 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“The [reasonable suspicion analysis] 
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.  Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human 
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same–and so are law enforcement officers.”).  
 38 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  
 39 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (“[A] person approached [by an officer] need 
not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may 
go on his way.”). 
 40 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.  
 41 The majority in Wardlow does not explicitly state that headlong flight alone is not sufficient to 
support probable cause.  However, the majority, as well as Justice Stevens’ concurrence in part and 
dissent in part, made it clear that the majority did not adopt the bright-line rule requested by the 
prosecution: That flight at the sight of a police officer automatically creates reasonable suspicion.  
See Wardlow, 528, U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight . . . is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing . . . 
.”); id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court today wisely 
endorses neither per se rule.  Instead, it rejects the proposition that flight is . . . necessarily indicative 
of ongoing criminal activity . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 42 Id. at 124–25 (majority opinion).  
 43 Id.  
 44 See, e.g., Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Reduce Crime, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/more-
police-managed-more-effectively-really-can-reduce-crime/385390/ (finding that a 28% increase in 
the amount of police officers employed correlated with a drop in crime of about 5% over the same 
period).  
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individual wants to avoid police contact, potentially, because the individual 
is engaged in criminal activity.  The fact that such behavior occurs in a high-
crime area, one may reason, only amplifies the suspicion that may 
accompany unprovoked flight. 
This logic, along with the rest of Wardlow’s “commonsense judgements,” 
is better understood when placed within its historical context.  Wardlow was 
decided in 2000 in the wake of a period of law enforcement reform that 
popularized “broken windows” policing.  The concept was introduced in 
1982 when George Kelling and James Wilson published an article in the 
Atlantic arguing for increased criminalization of quality-of-life offenses, such 
as public drinking and vagrancy, and emphasizing the necessity to maintain 
order in public places.45  Although Kelling and Wilson’s goal of maintaining 
order in public places did not explicitly call for an increase in Terry stops, in 
practice the increased police enforcement of quality-of-life crimes coincided 
with a need to increase police investigation of individuals suspected of 
engaging in criminal activity.46  
Kelling and Wilson’s ideas were soon implemented across the country, 
most famously in New York City where Police Commissioner William 
Bratton and Mayor Rudy Giuliani specifically traced the roots of their 
quality-of-life initiative back to Kelling and Wilson’s article.47  The 
effectiveness of broken windows policing is still contested today.48  
Regardless, by 2000, the year in which Wardlow was decided, broken 
 
 45 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-
windows/304465/?mod=article_inline.  
 46 See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 407, 429 (2000) (“As a matter that 
was secondary in theory but, perhaps, primary in practice, ‘Broken Windows’ policing also justified 
very large numbers of ‘frisks’ . . . .”).  
 47 N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW 
YORK 4 (1994), http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/Bratton-blueprint-1994—Reclaiming-the-
public-spaces-of-NY.pdf.  
 48 See William McGurn, Opinion, The Idea That Made America’s Cities Safer, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-idea-that-made-americas-cities-safer-
11546039296?emailToken=ca76f543912d90cd5ba5bdd69c30f12falFQ7PAk3kBzqRi6uicOITP/
LuOfGHTitr49pst+R/GexuEU1XpNygEqMrVMwXq7QdqjcScJIYc06+JyAxDn8r5pOWlrntG
l+l/krIg0nog%3D&reflink=article_imessage_share (last updated Dec. 29, 2018, 11:43 AM) 
(arguing that recent legislation aimed at relieving overincarceration represents a dangerous move 
away from broken windows policing); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New 
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 CHI. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006) 
(“[E]vidence from New York City and from the five-city social experiment provides no support for 
a simple first-order disorder-crime relationship as hypothesized by Wilson and Kelling, nor for the 
proposition that broken windows policing is the optimal use of scarce law enforcement resources.”). 
August 2020] WARDLOW REVISITED 1531 
windows policing was championed by many as an effective means by which 
to reduce crime.49 
With “broken windows” in the backdrop, Wardlow expanded further 
police authority to stop and frisk individuals.  The Wardlow Court recognized 
that strengthening police power does not come without costs.  The fact that 
“there are innocent reasons for flight from police[,]” the Court admitted, “is 
undoubtedly true.”50  That was a risk the Court was willing to accept, 
however, reasoning that a “Terry stop [results in] far more minimal intrusion” 
than more drastic police action, such as an arrest on probable cause.51  This 
may be true in a world where instances of police brutality do not regularly 
appear in the media52 or where police profiling is not substantially 
documented.53  But in a world where routine Terry stops end in questionable 
arrests54 and in the case of Freddie Gray’s death, the intrusions that Wardlow 
waives off as acceptable risks do not seem so minimal.    
II.  THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF WARDLOW  
In order to understand Wardlow’s flaws, it is important to review and 
address the arguments in favor of the Court’s decision.  These arguments 
include: (1) an assumption that an individual’s flight at the sight of a police 
officer in a high-crime area indicates criminal behavior; (2) a concern that 
not allowing stops in this context would handcuff police officers and 
 
 49 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, 
the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 293 
(1998) (“[I]t is today practically impossible to find a single scholarly article that takes issue with the 
quality-of-life initiative.”).  
 50 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  
 51 Id. at 126.  
 52 See, e.g., Byron Mason II, Is the Media to Blame for Police Brutality?, PRINDLE POST (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.prindlepost.org/2018/04/is-media-to-blame-for-police-brutality/ (documenting the 
string of highly publicized instances of police brutality against African Americans such as Trayvon 
Martin, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, Philando Castile, and Stephon Clark).  
 53 See, e.g., N.J. ST. POLICE REV. TEAM, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM 
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 20, 1999) (announcing the findings of a 
New Jersey report, which found that although a majority of the motorists using the New Jersey 
Turnpike were white, roughly 40% of motorists stopped were non-white, over 77% of searches 
involved non-whites, and 61.7% of arrests involved blacks); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk practices 
to be racially discriminatory and therefore in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
 54 See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE NYPD’S STOP-AND-FRISK POLICY 1 (May 15, 2013), 
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072495-StopFriskReport.pdf (“[M]any of the 
arrests [subsequent to a stop and frisk] occur under questionable circumstances, such as when 
people are asked to remove marijuana from their pockets and then arrested for possessing 
marijuana ‘in public view.’”).  
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incentivize bad behavior; and (3) a belief that the benefits resulting from such 
stops outweigh any accompanying costs.  As explained in later sections, these 
arguments falter when analyzed using empirical evidence and when viewed 
in light of the practical realities of how some Terry stops are conducted.  
The Wardlow Court explicitly makes the first argument that a person’s 
flight at the sight of a police officer indicates they are engaged in criminal 
activity.  The Court notes that, “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent 
factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”55  But running from the police, 
the Court argues, goes above and beyond mere nervousness in the presence 
of an officer.  The Court highlights this distinction by describing headlong 
flight as “the consummate act of evasion[,]” which is certainly suggestive of 
wrongdoing.56  The Court goes on to reject the notion that running at the 
sight of a police officer conforms with the precedent that individuals have the 
right to ignore the police and go about their business.  Instead, the Court 
concludes that “[f]light, by its very nature, is not going about one’s business; 
in fact, it is just the opposite.”57  
Wardlow may be defended further on the grounds that an individual’s 
flight from the police is even more indicative of criminal activity when it 
occurs in a high-crime area.  Again, the Wardlow Court makes this argument 
explicitly.  Acknowledging that flight alone cannot support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion, the Wardlow Court argues that Wardlow’s presence in 
a high-crime area, in conjunction with his flight at the sight of a police officer, 
does support reasonable suspicion.58  The Court notes that “the fact that the 
stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual 
considerations in a Terry analysis.”59  Essentially, the Court imputes the 
characteristics of an individual’s neighborhood onto the individual, 
reasoning that the likelihood that a person present in a high-crime area is 
committing a crime is higher than it would be for a person in a low-crime 
area.  While this assumption may hold true in the aggregate,60 it does not 
necessarily hold true when the context is confined to a specific situation, such 
as when an individual runs at the sight of a police officer.  As explained in 
 
 55 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 58 Id. at 124–25. 
 59 Id. at 124 (citation omitted). 
 60 There is reason to believe that this assumption may not be true, even in the aggregate, as 
disproportionate levels of policing and both conscious and unconscious bias can lead to inaccurate 
crime statistics.  See Kim Farbota, Black Crime Rates: What Happens When Numbers Aren’t Neutral, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kim-farbota/black-crime-
rates-your-st_b_8078586.html (explaining how the heavier policing of urban neighborhoods and 
overt racism can lead to minorities being arrested and convicted at much higher rates than 
demographics that engage in criminal activities at the same rate).  
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later sections, the empirical evidence in this context points to the conclusion 
that running from the police is not a reliable indicator of criminal activity, 
especially in the context of high-crime areas.  
A second argument in favor of Wardlow is that its outcome yields the most 
favorable incentive structure.61  Barring the police from stopping those who 
flee at the sight of them would arguably incentivize non-compliance with 
officers’ questioning.  If fleeing at the sight of an officer in a high-crime area 
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion, individuals who are engaged in 
criminal activity will be encouraged to flee from the police safe in the 
knowledge that the police will not have the authority to pursue them.  This 
may handcuff police officers in situations where they might otherwise curb 
illegal activity.   
While it may be true that prohibiting officers from stopping those who 
run at the sight of them may incentivize those engaged in criminal activity to 
always run, this rule would hold true for criminals in low and high-crime 
areas alike.  Having a rule that differentiates between low and high-crime 
areas disregards the potential skewed incentive structure that such a rule 
would create in low-crime areas.  Distinguishing between low and high-crime 
areas is especially problematic in the face of empirical evidence, discussed 
below, that suggests that those who run from the police in low-crime areas 
are actually more likely to be engaged in criminal activity than those who 
run in high-crime areas.  
A third argument in favor of Wardlow is that the benefit gained from 
investigating individuals that flee at the sight of the police in high-crime areas 
outweighs the cost of whatever liberty is sacrificed by allowing such stops.62  
A Terry stop “simply allow[s] the officer to briefly investigate further[,]” the 
Court explains.63  “If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of 
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way.”64  
Moreover, while a Terry frisk for weapons has been viewed since its inception 
as “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great 
indignity and arouse strong resentment,”65 Wardlow stops short of creating a 
 
 61 This argument is not directly articulated in the Wardlow majority’s opinion.  However, the Court 
does address the balance between allowing officers to investigate individuals further with 
individuals’ right to go about their business.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (“Allowing officers 
confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the 
individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police 
questioning.”).  
 62 See id. at 126 (explaining that Terry accepts the risk of stopping innocent individuals and that such 
stops result in minimal intrusion).  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).  
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bright-line rule legalizing such frisks in all situations where an individual has 
been stopped subsequent to running from the police.66  Instead, the 
precedent remains that Terry frisks can only be conducted when an officer 
has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.67   
Thus, one might argue that the liberty lost by an individual who is 
stopped after fleeing from the police in a high-crime area is outweighed by 
the benefit that would result from preventing potential criminal activity.  But 
when the number of innocents stopped becomes disproportionate to the 
number of criminals discovered, this cost-benefit argument falters.  
Furthermore, Wardlow’s silence as to whether flight from a police officer in a 
high-crime area justifies a frisk for weapons fails to protect individuals that 
are subject to such stops.  Judges often accept officers’ justifications for frisks 
despite empirical evidence suggesting that many of the common justifications 
are poor indicators that an individual is armed.68  Finally, stopping an 
individual who flees at the sight of a police officer presents the possibility that 
someone will be injured as a result of the chase.  This danger is not 
theoretical; it is a reality as evidenced by the death of Freddie Gray.  
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DEBUNKS WARDLOW’S  
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS   
Wardlow’s conclusion that an individual’s flight from the police in a high-
crime area supports reasonable suspicion to stop that individual relies on two 
major assumptions.  First, Wardlow assumes that a person who runs at the 
sight of a police officer in a high-crime area is, in fact, reasonably likely to be 
involved in criminal activity.  Second, Wardlow’s distinction between high 
and low-crime areas assumes that a person in a low-crime area that runs at 
the sight of a police officer is less likely to be involved in criminal activity than 
a person who does so in a high-crime area.  When analyzed in light of 
empirical evidence and societal trends, however, these assumptions prove to 
be highly questionable.  
Wardlow justifies its commonsense judgement that running from the 
police in a high-crime area corresponds with criminal behavior by pointing 
 
 66 In fact, the Wardlow Court explicitly states from the outset that it takes “no opinion as to the 
lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.”   Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 n.2.  
 67 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
 68 See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a 
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 541 (2018) (“The data show that certain factors 
regularly reported by police, such as observations of a ‘bulge,’ a suspect not being cooperative, 
having their hands in their pockets, presence in a high-crime neighborhood, acting nervous or 
making furtive movements, and ‘flight’ are poor predictors of whether one is armed and dangerous, 
yet the courts have regularly credited these explanations in sustaining police frisks.”).  
August 2020] WARDLOW REVISITED 1535 
to the scientific uncertainties that surround reasonable suspicion 
determinations.  “In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct,” the 
Court rationalized, “courts do not have available empirical studies dealing 
with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably 
demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where 
none exists.”69  Thus, because the Court believed there was no objective data 
on which it could rely on, it turned to personal experience to justify its belief.    
In the absence of empirical data, common sense might well serve a court 
to arrive at the best outcome possible.  However, personal experience is no 
substitute for empirical data, and as it turns out, the Wardlow Court did 
indeed have access to “empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from 
suspicious behavior.”70  In fact, New York’s Office of Attorney General 
(OAG) released a report (the Report) just six weeks before Wardlow was 
decided providing relevant empirical data with which to analyze the 
propositions set forth in Wardlow.71 
According to the Report, which collected data on approximately 175,000 
stops that occurred in New York City over the course of the year, the city-
wide hit-rate, or ratio of total stops to the number of stops that led to an 
arrest, was 9:1.72  This means that for every nine people stopped on the street 
by an officer suspecting that person of criminal behavior, only one person 
was eventually arrested.  The Report also includes more specific data relating 
to the central question that was presented to the court in Wardlow.  
The Report shows that the hit-rate on individuals who run after noticing 
the police73 is 15.8:1.74  The hit-rate for individuals who run in the presence 
of the police, not controlling for whether they noticed the police or not, in a 
high-crime area is 20.3:1.75  Most relevantly, the hit-rate for individuals who, 
while in a high-crime area, run after noticing the police—the same context 
the Court analyzed in Wardlow—is an astounding 45:1.76  The empirical data 
from the Report illustrates that an individual who runs after seeing a police 
officer while in a high-crime area is about five times less likely to ultimately 
 
 69 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.  
 70 Id.  
 71 See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science 
Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 786 (2000) (detailing 
the results of the New York State Attorney General’s report on stop and frisk practices in New York 
City).  
 72 Id. at 787.  
 73 Note that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police” was the relevant criteria that the Court 
considered in Wardlow.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).  
 74 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.  
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.   
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be arrested on probable cause than those stopped in all other situations.77  
Thus, New York’s 1999 OAG Report suggests that Wardlow’s underlying 
assumption is false.  Flight from the police in a high-crime area proves to be 
an incredibly poor indicator of criminal activity.  
We should not turn a blind eye to such powerful empirical data, especially 
in a world where data analysis has infiltrated nearly all facets of our lives.  
Empirical data provides more objective information to supplement our easily 
skewed “commonsense judgements” in reasonable suspicion analyses.78  
Additionally, this kind of empirical data can provide broader insight into how 
our communities perceive and interact with law enforcement.  In other 
words, the empirical data provided by New York’s 1999 OAG Report should 
not only be used to challenge Wardlow’s precedent, it should also prompt 
deeper questions into why forty-four innocent individuals in a high-crime 
area run after noticing the police for every one individual that is arrested.79 
It is not a novel idea that there are innocent reasons for an individual to 
run from the police.  In fact, Justice Stevens expressed this belief when he 
concurred in part and dissented in part to Wardlow’s majority opinion.80  
Justice Stevens agreed that the Court should not adopt a bright-line rule 
regarding whether running from the police supports reasonable suspicion.81  
He stated reviewing courts should look to the “totality of the circumstances–
the whole picture.”82  However, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s 
commonsense conclusion that flight in the presence of police is a reliable 
indicator of criminal behavior.  
Justice Stevens’ listed a number of innocent explanations for why a 
person would run in the presence of a police officer.  “A pedestrian may 
 
 77 As compared to the previously mentioned 9:1 hit-rate for all stops conducted in New York City 
during the course of the study.  Id. at 787, 790.  
 78 See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, supra note 68 (discussing the potential positive impacts that 
the use of empirical data could have on Terry stop and frisk analyses more broadly).  
 79 This of course assumes that those who are not arrested are found to not be engaging in criminal 
activity.  It is possible that a police officer might find evidence supporting probable cause, but 
nonetheless not arrest an individual.  However, I have come across no evidence to suggest such is 
the case for a large number of stops.  See Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory Arrest and 
Police Tort Liability for Failure to Assist Battered Women, 6 BERK. J. GENDER L. & JUST. 215, 221 n.29 
(suggesting that police officers may be more likely to not arrest despite having probable cause in 
white middle class communities, compared with arrest rates with probable cause in poor or minority 
communities).  
 80 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 81 Id. at 127.  
 82 Id.  
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break into a run for a variety of reasons,”83 Justice Stevens stated, “any of 
which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity.”84  In 
addition to coincidental flight, Justice Stevens added, there are entirely 
innocent reasons for flight “[e]ven assuming . . . that a person runs because 
he sees the police.”85  Among the reasons that Justice Stevens lists for why an 
innocent individual might run after noticing a police officer is a fear of being 
apprehended as a guilty party, an unwillingness to appear as a witness, and 
a desire to escape the danger from ongoing criminal activity that an officer’s 
sudden presence may signify.86 
But perhaps the most pertinent motive Justice Stevens puts forth for why 
individuals may run at the sight of the police is a fear of the police themselves.  
“Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high 
crime areas,”87 explains Justice Stevens “there is also the possibility that the 
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes 
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous . . . .”88  Stevens cites to a 
host of survey findings and empirical studies that help explain the findings of 
New York’s 1999 OAG Report.  The surveys and studies illustrate 
discriminatory police practices and a corresponding distrust and fear of the 
police, especially in the context of stop and frisks.89  One article Justice 
Stevens cites provides an account from black leaders complaining that 
innocent people were being picked up in drug sweeps, noting that “[s]ome 
 
 83 For example, a pedestrian may begin running “to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to 
seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in 
time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or 
simply to answer the call of nature.”  Id. at 128–29. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 131.  
 86 Id.  
 87 Due to the high-concentration of minorities in inner-city neighborhoods and poverty police 
practices that disproportionately target minorities for drug offenses, minorities such as African 
Americans disproportionately live in high-crime areas.  See Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to Dump 
the High Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76, 87 (2016) (showing that although African 
Americans account for only 17% of drug use nationwide, they represent 37% of those arrested for 
drug use, and 46% of those convicted for drug offenses, while whites account for 82% of drug use 
and only 62% of drug arrests).  
 88 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132. 
 89 For example, Justice Stevens cites to a brief from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
which details disproportionate street stops of minority residents in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania and St. Petersburg, Florida.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7 (citing Brief for 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 17–19, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036)).  Justice Stevens also cites to a report by the National Institute of 
Justice, which found that 43% of African-Americans consider “police brutality and harassment of 
African-Americans a serious problem” in their own communities.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7 
(citing Jean Johnson et al., Americans’ Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: A Look at Recent Survey Findings, 
NAT. INST. JUST. J. 133, 138 (Sept. 1997)).  
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teen-agers were so scared of the task force [that] they ran even if they weren’t 
selling drugs.”90  
We will never know what led Freddie Gray to run at the sight of the 
police.  We do know, from studies like those cited to by Justice Stevens, that 
flight from the police can be spurred by fear over the presence of police 
officers themselves, rather than a desire to avoid being caught while engaged 
in criminal activity.  The fear and distrust of the police that those living in 
high crime areas may hold cannot be ignored, especially given a meager 45:1 
hit-rate among those fleeing from the police in a high-crime area.91  Thus, 
with empirical evidence indicating that flight from the police in a high-crime 
area is a poor indicator of criminal activity, it is time the Supreme Court 
reconsider Wardlow and its “commonsense judgements” about human 
behavior. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ITS CONTINUED APPLICABILITY TODAY 
Unfortunately, there has not been another study analyzing data akin to 
that used in New York’s 1999 OAG Report.92  Racial disparities continue to 
exist in the use of Terry stop and frisks.93  For example, while the total number 
of stops conducted in New York City has dramatically decreased in recent 
years,94 blacks and Latinos continue to be the overwhelming targets, with 
59% of stops being conducted on blacks, 29% on Latinos, and only 9% on 
whites in 2019.95  This is in stark contrast to the demographic makeup of 
 
 90 Wardlow, 528 at 133, n.8 (citing Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug War’s Emphasis on Law Enforcement 
Takes a Toll on Police, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 1991)).  
 91 Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.  
 92 The most recent report that New York State’s OAG released on stop and frisks came in November 
of 2013 but does not contain hit-rate data on individuals stopped after fleeing from the police in a 
high-crime area.  See generally CIV. RTS. BUREAU, N.Y.S OFF. ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON ARRESTS 
ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 
(Nov. 2013) (reviewing data collected from New York’s stop and frisk data, with a particular focus 
on arrests resulting from stop and frisks).  
 93 See id. at 5 (showing an increase in the amount of stop and frisks in New York City from 1998 to 
2012, the vast majority of which is due to an increase in stops conducted on black and Hispanic 
individuals); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Stop-and-Frisk Data, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-
and-frisk-data (providing data on stops conducted in New York City in 2019, which shows that 
88% of stops were conducted on blacks or Latinos while only 9% of stops were conducted on 
whites).  
 94 Between 2011 and 2019, the number of recorded stops that occurred in New York City went from 
685,724 to 13,459.  N.Y. C.L. UNION, Stop-and-Frisk Data, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-
frisk-data.  
95 Id.  
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New York City, which is 24.3% black, 29.1% Latino, and 42.7% white.96 
With the rise of social media97 leading to increased media coverage of police 
brutality against minorities,98 the motivation for a minority individual to flee 
at the sight of a police officer may be becoming stronger.  Thus, with the 
overall level of distrust and fear of the police arguably on the rise, the 
empirical data provided in New York’s 1999 OAG Report is as relevant as 
ever.   
The history of police brutality and its media coverage provide important 
context for understanding Wardlow today.  The trend of mass-media 
coverage of police brutality against minorities arguably began in 1991 with 
the highly publicized beating of Rodney King by police officers and the 
ensuing riots that took hold across Los Angeles.99  Beginning in 2012 with 
the death of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed, seventeen-year-old African 
American, at the hands of George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch 
coordinator, there has been a trend of extensive media coverage of instances 
of police brutality against unarmed black people.100  Martin’s death was 
followed by the killing of a number of unarmed101 black men and boys, 
including Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and eventually Freddie 
Gray, among others.102  Most recently, the killings of George Floyd and 
Breonna Taylor have caused nation-wide protests and reignited calls for 
 
96  See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, Quick Facts: New York City, New 
York, available at https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork (last visited Apr. 3, 
2020). 
 97 Social media has been instrumental in raising awareness of racial injustice in America.  See Bijan 
Stephen, Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power/ 
(discussing social media’s pivotal role in spurring the Black Lives Matter Movement by making 
videos of police violence against minorities go viral). 
 98 See, e.g., Mason II, supra note 52 (documenting the string of highly publicized instances of police 
brutality against African Americans such as Trayvon Martin, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, 
Philando Castile, and Stephon Clark). 
 99 See Hemant Shah, Press Coverage of Interethnic Conflict: Examples from the Los Angeles Riots of 1992, 2007 
J. DISP. RESOL. 177, 181–82 (2007) (suggesting that mass media may have been a cause of some of 
the social unrest that followed the beating of Rodney King).  
 100 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage, CNN (Apr. 
21, 2015, 7:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-
attitudes/index.html (proposing that the belief that the number of instances minorities are being 
victimized by the police is increasing is untrue, but rather, increased media coverage is distorting 
society’s perspective of how common police brutality against minorities is).  
 101 The only exception being the small knife that was found on Freddie Gray after officers frisked him.  
See Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody - What We Know, supra note 2.   
 102 See 14 High-Profile Police-Related Deaths of U.S. Blacks, CBC (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:40 PM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/list-police-related-deaths-usa-1.4438618 (documenting fourteen 
high-profile deaths of black men that occurred during police encounters).  
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police reform.103  Each death came at the hand of law enforcement officers 
and received substantial media coverage.104 
While the deaths of these young black men and women received 
extensive media coverage and spurred the Black Lives Matter Movement, 
they represent only a small portion of the total number of minority 
individuals killed by police officers in recent years.105  While the more 
heinous killings of unarmed minorities are usually the ones to attract 
extensive media coverage, a total of 1,000 people per year are killed by the 
police, with Latino and black men being on average three times more likely 
to be killed by the police than white men.106  These deaths take a significant 
toll on the mental health of minority communities.107  Highly publicized 
incidences of police brutality against minorities also contribute to a growing 
fear of police contact among minority communities.108  In the wake of 
Freddie Gray’s death, for example, many Baltimore men said they would 
 
103  See Deneen L. Brown, Violent deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor reflect a brutal American 
legacy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 3, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/
06/history-of-lynching-violent-deaths-reflect-brutal-american-legacy/ (explaining how the killings 
of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery led to nation-wide protests and 
demonstrate why the oppression of black people remains the nation's greatest burden). 
 104 See Police Shootings Have Not Increased, But Media Coverage Has, 10-8 VIDEO, https://www.10-
8video.com/blog/police-shootings-not-increased-media-coverage (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) 
(detailing the rise of smartphones, social media, and police dash and body cams and the role they 
have played in the coverage of police shootings).  
 105 See Garrett Chase, The Early History of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and the Implications Thereof, 18 
NEV. L.J. 1091, 1099 (2018) (covering the history of the Black Lives Matter Movement and its use 
of social media to combat police brutality against blacks).  
 106 See Frank Edwards & Michael H. Esposito, Police kill about 3 men per day in the US, according to new study, 
CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2018, 6:40 AM), http://theconversation.com/police-kill-about-3-men-
per-day-in-the-us-according-to-new-study-100567 (noting that 0.7 white men per 100,000 are 
killed by police annually, compared with 2.2 deaths per 100,000 black and Latino men annually).  
 107 One study conducted by the Lancet, a prominent medical journal, found that police killings correlate 
with an additional 1.7 days of poor mental health annually among black adults.  See Erin B. Logan, 
This Is How Police Killings Affect Black Mental Health, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018, 9:41 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/07/09/this-is-how-police-
killings-affect-black-mental-health/?utm_term=.fe0de63b0662 (detailing the results of a new 
medical study, which found there to be an adverse effect on mental health among minorities 
subsequent to police shootings).  
 108 See Angelica Delgado, Police Brutality: Impacts on Latino and African American Lives and Communities, 
SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCHOLAR COMMONS 1, 14 (2016) (noting that some people have a fear of 
the police instilled in them at a very young age due to instances of police brutality that occur in 
their communities).  The fear of the police that some minorities share is also fueled by police officers’ 
words, rather than their actions.  See Christine Hauser & Jacey Fortin, ‘We Only Kill Black People,’ 
Police Officer Says During Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/31/us/black-kill-police-georgia.html (reporting on a video that captured a police officer 
comforting a white woman, saying “But you’re not black . . .  Remember, we only kill black people. 
Yeah. We only kill black people, right?”).  
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continue to run from the police in the future, with one man saying Gray’s 
death “makes you run faster.”109  
These highly publicized deaths coincide with a growing distrust of the 
police among blacks.  The percent of blacks that have confidence in the 
police has fallen from 34% in 1998, a year which compromises a majority of 
the data New York’s 1999 OAG Report analyzed,110 to an even more meager 
30% in June of 2017, according to Gallup polls.111  This suggests that overall 
confidence in the police among blacks may be lower now than it was in 1999, 
when New York’s 1999 OAG Report found the hit-rate for individuals in 
high-crime areas who run after noticing the police to be just 45:1.112  While 
correlation does not necessarily mean causation, and there are undeniably 
additional factors at play, mass-media coverage of police brutality against 
young, black men coincides with a declining confidence in the police among 
blacks.  This trend suggests that innocent, minority individuals’ motivation 
to run after noticing the police has, if anything, increased since New York’s 
1999 OAG Report was released.  
Distrust of the police becomes an even more relevant motive for flight in 
the face of police presence when placed in the context of high-crime areas.  
Blacks are more likely than other demographics to live in inner-city 
neighborhoods, which disproportionately correspond with high-crime 
 
 109 Those interviewed in Baltimore after Freddie Gray’s death said that running from the police is “a 
way of life” and that people often run when they have done nothing wrong.  See John Eligon, Running 
From Police is the Norm, Some in Baltimore Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/us/running-from-police-is-the-norm-some-in-baltimore-
say.html (“Young men in the heavily policed neighborhood where 25-year-old Freddie Gray was 
chased by the police . . . say running from officers is a way of life with its own playbook . . . . And if 
getting caught seems inevitable, surrender where there are plenty of witnesses to reduce the odds 
of being beaten.”).  
 110 New York’s 1999 OAG Report covered stops that occurred in 1998 and the first three months of 
1999.  Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 786 n.187.  
 111 Compare Lawrence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in Criminal Justice 8 (2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-1.pdf (“[A] Gallup poll reports that whites have 
almost twice as much confidence in police (61 percent) as do blacks (34%).”) with Eugene Scott, Only 
One-Third of African Americans Say They Have Confidence in the Police. Killings Like Alton Sterling’s Are 
Part of the Reason., WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-fix/wp/2018/03/27/only-one-third-of-african-americans-say-they-have-confidence-in-the-
police-killings-like-alton-sterlings-are-part-of-the-reason/?utm_term=.3d72c26f731d (“Only 30 
percent of black Americans have confidence in the police, according to a Gallup poll from June.”).  
See also Claire Gecewicz & Lee Rainie, Why Americans Don’t Fully Trust Many Who Hold Positions of 
Power and Responsibility, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.people-
press.org/2019/09/19/why-americans-dont-fully-trust-many-who-hold-positions-of-power-and-
responsibility/ (“Roughly seven-in-ten white Americans (72%) say police officers treat racial and 
ethnic groups equally at least some of the time.  By way of comparison, half of Hispanics and just 
33% of black adults say the same.”). 
 112 See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790.  
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areas.113  Additionally, statistics show blacks to be disproportionately targeted 
by the police for violent crimes and drug offenses.114  For example, while 
blacks account for only 14% of the United States population and 17% of 
drug use nationwide, they represent 37% of those arrested for drug use and 
46% of all defendants convicted for drug offenses.115  
This phenomenon could explain the findings from New York’s 1999 
OAG Report that while the hit-rate for all individuals who ran after noticing 
the police was 15.8:1, the hit-rate when confined to individuals who ran after 
noticing the police in high-crime areas is 45:1.116  Thus, the empirical data 
suggests that Wardlow’s second assumption, that a person in a low-crime area 
who runs at the sight of a police officer is less likely to be involved in criminal 
activity than a person who does so in a high-crime area, is false. Instead, the 
data suggests that those running to elude the police are less likely to be 
engaged in criminal activity in high-crime areas, which are 
disproportionately comprised of minorities, compared to individuals running 
to elude the police in low or average-crime areas.  
It may be impossible to know exactly why a given individual living in a 
high-crime area may run at the sight of the police despite being innocent of 
criminal behavior.  However, the belief among many minorities that the 
highly publicized instances of police brutality against minorities are not 
isolated incidents, but signs of a broader problem, suggests that a distrust of 
the police may be the driving force behind such behavior.117  At the same 
time, it is less common for whites to believe that the deaths of blacks during 
encounters with the police are signs of a broader problem,118 and the deaths 
of whites during encounters with the police happen at a much lower rate.119  
This explains why a white individual living in Beverly Hills who runs at the 
sight of a police officer may be more likely to be engaged in criminal activity 
than a minority individual who does so while living in a high-crime area, as 
 
 113 See Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 76, 
86 (2016) (examining how the high-concentration of blacks in inner-city neighborhoods, combined 
with the targeting of blacks for drug offenses, has led to blacks disproportionately living in high-
crime areas).  
 114 Id. at 86–87.  
 115 Id. at 87.  
 116 See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790. 
 117 See Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge: Police views, public views, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/police-views-public-views/ (showing that while 
72% of white police officers believe that the deaths of blacks during encounters with the police are 
isolated incidents, 79% of blacks overall believe such incidents are signs of a broader problem).  
 118 See id. (showing that 54% of whites believe that the deaths of blacks during encounters with the 
police are signs of a broader problem, compared with 79% of blacks that believe the same).  
 119 See Edwards & Esposito, supra note 106 (showing that blacks are three times more likely to be killed 
by the police than are whites).  
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the data in New York’s 1999 OAG Report suggests.120  This trend of 
declining confidence in the police among minorities indicates that the 
findings of New York’s 1999 OAG Report are as relevant today as ever.  
V.  WARDLOW’S STRUCTURAL PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS  
Putting aside the statistical ineffectiveness of Wardlow’s assumptions in 
predicting criminal activity, Wardlow also contains a structural problem in its 
reliance on an ambiguous and undefined high-crime rate factor to establish 
reasonable suspicion.  In concluding that an individual’s flight in a high-
crime area created reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, the Supreme 
Court recognized that each factor alone, both flight and an individual’s 
presence in a high-crime area, are not enough to constitute reasonable 
suspicion.121  Yet, Wardlow’s reliance on an individual’s presence in a high-
crime area as a determinative factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis is 
misguided due to the factor’s ambiguity.  Even if the Supreme Court adopts 
a more objective test for defining what constitutes a high-crime area, the use 
of the factor still proves to be an ineffective predictor of criminal activity 
based on the empirical evidence described earlier.  Thus, because the high-
crime area factor adds little to a reasonable suspicion analysis, and because 
flight alone cannot support reasonable suspicion, Wardlow’s precedent that 
flight in a high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion is inherently flawed.   
The Supreme Court first established an area’s crime rate as a relevant 
factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis in Adams v. Williamson.122  In 
upholding a stop that was based on less than probable cause, the Court 
concluded that, “[w]hile properly investigating the activity of a person who 
was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was 
sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, [the 
investigating officer] had ample reason to fear for his safety.”123  However, 
after including an area’s crime rate as a relevant factor in a reasonable 
suspicion analysis, the Supreme Court failed to offer guidance as to what 
qualifies as a high-crime area for Fourth Amendment purposes.124  
In the years that followed Adams, the Supreme Court began incorporating 
the characteristics of neighborhoods into reasonable suspicion analyses, most 
notably in cases dealing with illegal immigration where stops were conducted 
 
 120 See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 790 (finding that flight “motivated by the presence of a 
police officer” resulted in a stop-to-arrest ratio of 15.8:1, but in high crime areas, the stop-to-arrest 
ratio was 45:1).  
 121 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). 
 122 Adams v. Williamson, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).  
 123 Id. at 147–48.  
 124 Id.  
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in areas known for illegal immigrant traffic.125  Despite these developments, 
the Court opted not to establish an objective basis for determining when a 
location constitutes a high-crime area but rather deferred to officers’ prior 
experience in the area.126  Perhaps unsurprisingly, what constitutes a high-
crime area presented a difficult question for the lower courts in Wardlow.  
Following a state bench trial that found Sam Wardlow guilty of unlawful 
use of a weapon by a felon, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the 
judgement, explaining that the court found “no support in the record for the 
contention that [the] defendant was in a high crime location” other than an 
officer’s testimony that they noticed the defendant while on the way to a place 
that “was known to be a location where drugs were sold.”127  In defending its 
ruling, the appellate court recognized that “[t]o pass constitutional muster 
. . . the high crime area should be a sufficiently localized and identifiable 
location.”128  The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court 
about whether the incident occurred in a high-crime area but nonetheless 
affirmed the reversal of the trial court on grounds that the stop was not 
“based upon objective criteria pointing to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.”129  Where a lower court split practically teed up the issue, the 
Supreme Court whiffed, failing to provide a clear definition for what 
constitutes a high-crime area and instead reversing the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s decision on the general principle that flight in a high-crime area 
constitutes reasonable suspicion.130  Since Wardlow, courts have developed a 
myriad of definitions for what constitutes a high-crime area, none of which 
provide an easily applicable, objective basis for determining when a stop 
occurs in a high-crime area.131  
 
 125 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (“Officers may consider the 
characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.  Its proximity to the border, the usual 
patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien traffic are all 
relevant.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (“Of critical importance [to the Terry 
analysis], the officers knew that the area was a crossing point for illegal aliens.”).  
 126 See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (“[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms 
of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).  
 127 People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), 
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 128 Id. at 68.  
 129 People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 486–489 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 130 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).  The closest the Supreme Court gets to defining what 
constitutes a high-crime area is its description of the term as “an area of expected criminal activity.”  
Id. at 124. 
 131 See, e.g., United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the idea that specific 
data be required to prove an event took place in a high-crime area and adopting Wardlow’s 
description of the term as an area of expected criminal activity); Cunningham v. State, 884 So. 2d 
1121, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (describing a high-crime area “in [its] usual sense [as] being 
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Without a clear, objective definition for what constitutes a high-crime 
area, the factor raises far more questions than it answers.  At its most basic 
level, the high-crime area factor raises the question of how high the incidence 
of crime must be for an area to be considered a high-crime area.  Answering 
this question is not as simple as one might think.  Is it sufficient for an area 
to have above-average levels of crime, or is there some higher bar that must 
be met before high-crime area status is attained?  If the factor does refer to 
above average crime rates, does the standard relate to the national, state, or 
city average?  What constitutes the geographic scope of a high-crime area?  
Do we only look at a few square blocks, or do we analyze crime areas by 
neighborhood or city?  Does a high incidence of any type of crime in an area 
satisfy the high-crime area factor, or must the area have a high incidence of 
the type of crime that the officer is suspicious of an individual committing?  
Can high-crime area status change over time, and if so, when and how often?  
Does an officer’s prior knowledge of an area’s status as a high-crime area 
play a role in whether she has reasonable suspicion when she stops an 
individual, or do we analyze the factor in hindsight?  
Without answers to these questions, Wardlow’s high-crime area factor will 
remain substantially subjective, adding little, if any, value to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis.  This is especially true when an area’s high-crime status is 
determined almost entirely by the retrospective and subjective testimony of 
police officers.132  A court should not shirk its responsibility to make a legal 
conclusion of fact to police officers.133  While police officers may act in good 
faith in testifying to their personal experience regarding a neighborhood’s 
characteristics, their perspective may easily be skewed by the inevitable 
correlation between the time they spend in the areas they patrol and the rate 
 
riddled with narcotics dealings and drug-related shootings”); People v. Davis, 815 N.E.2d 92, 98–
99 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (defining a high-crime area as being an area that is “notorious for any type 
of criminal activity”); United States v. Rogers, No. Crim. 03-10313-RGS, 2005 WL 478001, at *1 
(D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2005) (describing a high-crime area as an area that is “plagued by gang-related 
shootings, drug dealings, assaults, and robberies”); State v. Biehl,  No. 22054, 2004 WL 2806340, 
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004) (defining a high-crime area as “an area of known drug activity, 
or perhaps a location under police surveillance”).  
 132 See, e.g., Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to Support an 
Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 
122 (2012) (“It is presumptively unreasonable that courts allow a mathematical conclusion like 
‘high-crime area’ to be defined by subjective testimony . . . .”); Reshaad Shirazi, It’s High Time to 
Dump the High-Crime Area Factor, 21 Berk. J. Crim. L. 76, 98 (2016) (“What is most troubling about 
[the Wardlow opinion] is that [it] allowed the prosecution to satisfy the ‘high-crime area’ designation 
based solely on the subjective testimony of a single officer.”).  
 133 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1587, 1624 (2008) (“[I]n relying on the testifying officer for the opinion about an area, courts are 
shifting the responsibility to police to make what is a legal conclusion.”).  
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at which they perceive crimes to occur in those areas.134  Thus, if an area’s 
crime-rate is to add any objective value to the reasonable suspicion analysis, 
courts must shift away from their reliance on officers’ personal experiences 
and towards the use of empirical data. 
The implementation of an objective method for determining whether a 
stop occurred in a high-crime area is not a far-flung idea.  In fact, some 
prominent academics have already put forth proposals that could replace the 
existing subjective method with an objective approach based on empirical 
data.  For example, Andrew Ferguson and Damien Bernache proposed an 
objective approach to determining when an incident occurred in a high-
crime area based on three components:  
First, the area in question would have to be demonstrated to be marked by 
a high incidence of particularized criminal activity in comparison to 
neighboring areas with objective and verifiable data.  Second, the area at 
issue would have to be narrowly tailored to a certain geographic location 
(perhaps including particular blocks, housing complexes, parks, or 
intersections) and would have to be current, limited to a recent temporal 
finding of recent crime activity.  Third, the nexus between the particularized 
criminal activity and the officer’s observation would have to be 
demonstrated.135 
The Supreme Court adopting such an approach would resolve a number 
of ambiguities around the current methods courts use to determine when a 
stop occurred in a high-crime area.  With new crime-mapping technologies, 
this approach could be implemented to not only inform courts’ reasonable 
suspicion analyses retrospectively, but also to inform officers in real-time as 
to whether an individual they are suspicious of is located in an area with 
recent criminal activity of the type they suspect the individual to be engaged 
in.136  If the Supreme Court is to continue its use of a location’s crime-rate in 
reasonable suspicion analyses, it is imperative for it to adopt an objective 
determination to prevent an area’s crime rate from serving as a proxy for 
speculative hunches and unconscious biases.  
Yet, even with an objective approach to defining what constitutes a high-
crime area, the use of an individual’s presence in a high-crime area to impute 
reasonable suspicion remains problematic.  In Wardlow’s context, for 
 
 134 See id. (“[W]e expect police officers to consider their beats a high-crime area because they are 
looking for—or responding to—reports of crime every day.”).  
 135 Id. at 1628. 
 136 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 219 (2011) (“With advancement in GIS technology, data-collection 
mechanisms now allow for a more particularized understanding of crime patterns in Fourth 
Amendment suppression hearings . . . . In some jurisdictions, new crime maps are generated every 
twenty-four hours and can be shared with officers and staff and even emailed to officers on the 
beat.”).  
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example, an individual who flees after noticing a police officer is less likely to 
have been engaged in criminal activity than an individual who does the same 
in an average to low-crime area, according to empirical evidence.137  
Additionally, some minorities are more likely than other demographics to 
live in urban neighborhoods where crime rates tend to be higher.138  This 
phenomenon may be explained by disproportionate targeting of minorities 
for violent crimes and drug offenses.139  While transitioning to a more 
objective approach to determine high-crime areas would limit the use of the 
high-crime area factor as a substitute for “specific and articulable facts,”140 it 
would distribute uneven levels of constitutional protections to citizens based 
on where they live.141  The Terry doctrine’s use of reasonable suspicion 
inherently requires police officers to consider the context of their 
observations, but it is important for both courts and law enforcement to not 
“tar people with the sins of their neighbors.”142   
Therefore, a reasonable suspicion analysis would be improved by doing 
away with the high-crime area factor altogether.  In fact, some state courts 
have already begun challenging Wardlow’s precedent using empirical data.143  
For example, in Commonwealth v. Warren, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
held that flight from a police officer, even in a high-crime area,144 does not 
 
 137 See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 71, at 787, 790 (noting that the stop-to-arrest ratio upon noticing 
the police is 45:1 in high crime areas, but 15.8:1 generally).  
 138 See Shirazi, supra note 113 (“[P]oor African Americans are more likely to reside in inner-city 
neighborhoods than whites” where there is more violent crime).  
 139 See id. at 86–87 (noting that African Americans are disproportionately arrested for violent crimes 
and drug offenses and that high rates of “poverty police practices” target inner-city neighborhoods).   
 140 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 141 See Shirazi, supra note 113, at 104 (“[T]he main concern [with the use of the high-crime area factor] 
is that high-crime areas are predominately high-black areas, and thus overly policing these areas 
disparately impact African Americans.”).  
 142 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(“[M]ore than mere war stories are required to establish the existence of a high-crime area . . . . 
[C]ourts should examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion.  Moreover, both 
courts and law enforcement must be careful not to tar people with the sins of their neighbors.”).  
 143 See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a 
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 538 (2018) (“[S]ome courts have recognized the 
relevance of empirical evidence in providing a more particularized Fourth Amendment analysis of 
the reasons provided for stops and frisks.”).  
 144 The Massachusetts Supreme Court never explicitly mentions crime-rate as being a factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.  However, the area the officer first saw the defendant, on Martin 
Luther King Boulevard in the Roxbury section of Boston, has been described as a high-crime area 
by those covering the case.  John G. Malcolm, Massachusetts Supreme Court Says It’s Perfectly 
Legitimate for Black Men to Flee Police, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.dailysignal.com/
2016/09/23/massachusetts-supreme-court-says-its-perfectly-legitimate-for-black-men-to-flee-
police/.  Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s silence on the high-crime area factor, in 
addition to its holding that empirical data suggests flight does not provide a valid inference of 
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support reasonable suspicion due to a recent Boston Police Department 
report documenting a pattern of racial profiling of black males in the city.145  
The court explained that it does not forbid lower courts from considering 
flight in a reasonable suspicion analysis but rather urges them to consider 
empirical data that bears on the validity of the motivations behind a Terry 
stop.146  
The Supreme Court should adopt a similar approach to the one used by 
Massachusetts’ Supreme Court, by either adopting a more objective method 
to defining high-crime areas or, preferably, dropping the high-crime area 
factor altogether.  Should the Court retain the high-crime area factor, it 
should be careful to confine its use to sufficiently specific locations within a 
narrow period of time, to prevent excessive and unwarranted variances in 
constitutional protections among citizens.  Importantly, improvements in 
data collection and technology since Wardlow have made switching to a more 
objective, data-driven approach to reasonable suspicion analyses more 
accessible than ever.147  It is now time for the courts to rectify Wardlow’s 
antiquated approach to the reasonable suspicion analysis by foregoing 
subjective judgements based on personal experience for more objective 
decisions based on empirical evidence.  
CONCLUSION 
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court used its “commonsense 
judgements” to conclude that an individual’s flight from the police in a high-
crime area supports reasonable suspicion to stop that individual.  However, 
empirical data provided by New York’s 1999 OAG Report shows that 
individuals who run to elude the police in a high-crime area are five times 
less likely to be engaged in criminal behavior than all other individuals 
stopped.   
A study analyzing hit-rate data on individuals who flee after noticing the 
police, as was done in New York’s 1999 OAG Report, has not been 
recreated.  However, mass media coverage of police brutality against 
 
criminal activity, is tantamount to a rejection of Wardlow’s precedent that flight in a high-crime area 
supports reasonable suspicion. 
 145 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342–43 (Mass. 2016).  
 146 Id. at 342.  
 147 See David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a 
World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 513 (2018) (“[T]here now exists an almost 
inexhaustible stream of data concerning a wide array of human activities . . . . Using powerful 
analytical computing, we can examine these vast troves of data to discover patterns that might 
otherwise remain hidden.”). 
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blacks,148 accompanied by growing levels of distrust of the police among 
minorities,149 suggests that the motivation for minorities to avoid police 
contact has grown stronger since 1999 when New York’s OAG Report was 
published.  Furthermore, Wardlow’s reliance on the high-crime area factor 
presents an inherent structural flaw to Wardlow’s precedent due to the 
ambiguity surrounding the factor’s definition and the variance in 
constitutional protections that it provides to citizens.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court should either adopt a more objective, data-driven approach for 
determining what constitutes a high-crime area or, preferably, drop the high-
crime rate factor altogether.  
It is now time for the Supreme Court to reject the precedent it set in 
Wardlow by recognizing that an individual’s effort to avoid police contact in 
a high-crime area does not, without additional information, support 
reasonable suspicion.  By foregoing its subjective use of “commonsense 
judgements” in favor of empirical data and the observance of societal trends, 
the Court may avoid unsubstantiated and often dangerous Terry stops in the 
future, such as the one that led to the death of Freddie Gray.   
  
 
 148 See Stephen, supra note 97 (discussing social media’s role in spurring the Black Lives Matter 
Movement); Mason II, supra note 52 (analyzing the role of media on police brutality); McLaughlin, 
supra note 100 (noting the increasing media coverage of police brutality against minorities); 14 high-
profile police-related deaths of U.S. blacks, supra note 102 (documenting 14 high-profile police-related 
deaths of black Americans).  
 149 See Sherman, supra note 111 (noting a Gallup poll that recorded that whites have almost twice as 
much confidence in police as do blacks); Scott, supra note 111 (reporting that a Gallup poll recorded 
decreasing levels of confidence in police from black Americans between 2001 and 2018). 
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